

C O P Y

Colonel L. K. White
Chief, FBIS
2430 E Street NW
Washington 25, D.C.

20 July 1948

Dear Colonel White:

It is impossible to tell from the local press what information if any you are receiving on the situation here in Cairo. That you may be adequately informed for planning purposes I am submitting an estimate of the situation together with recommendations.

THE SITUATION:

Although the Government of Egypt appears to be thoroughly satisfied that the FBIS operation is in no way directed against Governmental interests and seems to be content to allow continuation under the present agreements, the operation cannot be considered stable or secure.

As a result of recent bombing attacks, presumably by the Jews, and the Security Council's cease fire order, mob violence has broken out on a rather large scale. The violence is not directed toward any particular national group but against all non-Egyptian and non-Arabic groups. Jews, Greeks, British, and Americans have been killed or beaten within the last few days. The American who was killed was a sightseer and his wife was beaten. Several FBIS employees have been molested but no serious casualties yet. [redacted] and his family were stoned while riding in a taxi last evening. [redacted] has ordered that no one go down town at night. A bomb believed to be planted exploded one block from Sheppard's Hotel, where I am staying, last night and a mob immediately gathered. The police lost control of the situation but the mob was disbursed by an AA barrage which rained shell fragments on the streets. It is reported that a great many stabbings occurred during this episode.

The effect on our operation is that the personnel is terrified and we are having to transport them to and from their homes. Some absenteeism exists and it is likely that more will develop.

The situation may ease in which case our problems would decrease in direct proportion.

The situation may continue in the present tenor in which case we could continue our operations under the present difficult circumstances.

The situation may worsen in which case it would probably mean serious curtailment of the operation.

I am inclined to think that the second contingency will prevail for the duration of Ramadan gradually lifting to a more satisfactory state of affairs, however, I do not believe that we should be unprepared to establish an emergency operation in Cyprus on very short notice and to evacuate all American personnel and their families as well as other personnel who desire and could arrange exit.

RECOMMENDATION:

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That the Cyprus station be expedited. That plans for an

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EMERGENCY OPERATION BE EXPEDITED

emergency operation be expedited, and kept alive. That the build up of American personnel for the Mediterranean Bureau be confined to male employees at this time. That non-American personnel be trained elsewhere than in Cairo.

I plan to see [] very shortly at which time I will discuss these matters with him. Communications of a classified nature are only possible from Cairo to Cyprus at this time.

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Yours very truly,

/s/

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